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JUDICIAL METHOD AND ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES IN
CONFLICT OF LAWS
RAYMOND J. HE1LMANt
THE rules of the subject described by the term "Conflict of Laws"
undoubtedly are regarded by many persons as resting chiefly, if not en-
tirely, upon non-empirical and unpurposive bases and obtained mainly
by mechanical processes of logical derivation from a priori postulates
or sets of such postulates which in themselves are relatively abstract
and removed from the "stuff of experience" concretely presented in in-
dividual cases. Certainly the rules of Conflict of Laws generally are
regarded by lawyers as less affected by considerations of expediency and
objectives of a social or economic nature than the rules of intra-municipal
law. The "theoretical school" of jurists professedly treat the subject
as comprising very general and unparticularistic fundamental proposi-
tions and rules deductively derived from them.' The American "theo-
retical territorialists" appear to take such an attitude especially uncom-
promisingly, whatever the extent to which they may be found to have
departed from that attitude in the actual dispositions of specific prob-
lems. They rest their treatment of the subject upon the fundamental
postulates that ". . . The Conflict of Laws deals primarily with the
application of laws in space, ' that "Some proper law must have gov-
erned the juridical situation at the moment of its occurrence," that "the
effort of the court is to determine what that law was," and that "that is
a question of the power of some particular law to extend to and rule
the juridical situation."3
However, it may not be supposed reasonably that the mode of treat-
ment of the "theoretical territorialists" of this country has been adopted
entirely without regard for practical or empirical considerations. Under-
lying its employment may be the belief that maximum certainty of legal
consequences (as distinguished from assurance of certainty or proba-
tMember of the Wisconsin Bar.
1. DICEY, CoNFLIct or LAWS (Keith's ed. 1927) 14: "Their doctrine is . . . that the
fundamental principles of their subject can be ascertained by study and reflection, and
that the soundness of the rules maintained . . . can be tested by their conformity to, or
deviation from, such general principles. . . . Their object is to construct a logically con-
sistent series of rules, which either actually do agree with the rules as to the choice of law
upheld in different States, or ought, consistently with sound theory, to prevail in every
State."
2. BEA=E, CoNzLCr or LAWS (1916) 1.
3. Id. at 2. "For the creation of rights, . . . there must exist some law with power
to create them: or in the ordinary phrase, with jurisdiction." 3 BEALE, CASES ON THE
CoNiFrrcr OF LAWS (1902) 501, § 6. See note 15, infra.
OBJECTIVES IN CONFLICT OF LAWS
bility of economic or social consequences) is the supreme juridical
desideratum and the tacit assumption that such certainty can be at-
tained only by exclusive adherence to deductive method. Yet, the
dominating characteristic of the "theoretical territorial" mode of treat-
ment is the complete exclusion of empirical and expediential considera-
tions from the processes of determining what legal consequences shall be.
Observation and investigation of economic and social phemonena in ref-
erence to the operation of legal rules are allowed no parts or functions
in these processes. Avowedly, substantive conflict of laws rules are
obtained solely by deduction from premises taken as corollaries of a
fundamental postulate that for every non-procedural conflict of laws
question which can be presented, the domestic rule of some particular
state with which the factual situation is connected is inexorably coerced
upon the state of the forum, and must be applied whatever the relation
of the latter to the factual situation concerned. The particular foreign
state, or its "law" (i. e. its domestic rules, if renvoi difficulties are to
be avoided 4), is treated as having so-called conflict of laws "jurisdic-
tion"--power in space of an ambulatory or ubiquitous character-by
which the state of the forum is compelled to adopt whatever rule the
particular state singled out would apply in a corresponding domestic
factual situation.'
This treatment necessarily is contradictory to the very idea of the
"territoriality" of law, the idea of the exclusive operativeness of a state's
own law as such, within that state's boundaries, whatever the legal
problem concerned and whether the problem is a domestic one or one
4. See Lorenzen, The Renvoi Theory and the Application of Foreign Law (1910) 10
COL. L. REv. 190, 327; Lorenzen, The Renvoi Doctrine in the Conflict of Laws (1918)
27 YALE L. J. 509; Schreiber, The Doctrine of the Renvoi in Anglo-American Law (1918)
31 HARv. L. REv. 523; Lorenzen, The Theory of Qualifications and the Conflict of Laws
(1920) 20 CoL. L. REv. 247, 277.
5. ". . . the theoretical method has influenced Anglo-American writers ... chiefly in
the form of 'territorial' theories about law and legal rights. Such writers begin with
reflecting upon and establishing to their own satisfaction the general or essential nature
of law and legal rights. This leads them to certain general or fundamental principles,
supposed to flow from the nature of law and legal rights as thus established. These funda-
mental principles take the form of general statements as to what,--in view of the essential
nature of law and legal rights,--a state or country 'can' and 'cannot' do in the way of
creating rights, duties, and other legal relations. They thus come to think that the con-
flict of laws 'deals with the recognition and enforcement of foreign-created rights' [BEALE,
op. cit. supra note 3, 501; also, BEALE, op. cit. supra note 2, 1063 or that it has to do with
the application of law in space--back of which statements seems to be the assumption
(also deduced from the nature of law and legal rights) that for every situation dealt with
in the conflict of laws there is always some one and only one 'law' which has 'jurisdiction,'
i. e. power, to determine what legal consequences shall be attached to the given situation."
Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 457, 459.
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of conflict of laws. Negatively, the concept of the territoriality of law
involves the proposition that the law of a state is not operative as such
outside the state's boundaries. In reality, the fundamental postulate
of the theoretical territorialists is one of "extra-territoriality"; it asserts
extra-territorial "jurisdiction" of states other than that of the forum, in
particular cases, for the superimposing of their domestic rules upon the
state of the forum to make conflict of laws law for that state out of their
domestic rules. The method based upon this postulate is, therefore, not
territorial but pseudo-territorial. Plainly, it would be inconsistent with
the concept of the territoriality of law to treat the state of the forum
as subjected to the conflict of laws rule or rules of some other state in
reference to a conflict of laws case, apart from the objection that this
would allow the possibility of the creation of renvoi situations.' But,
to treat the state of the forum as subjected to the domestic rule of some
other state and that rule as turned into a conflict of laws rule for the
state of the forum, as super-imposed law, is no less inconsistent with the
idea of the territoriality of law (although the inconsistency may be
less noticeable on the surface). Besides, such treatment is manifestly
absurd from the standpoint that a problem is hardly to be considered
as satisfactorily solved by applying the solution which has been or would
be worked out for a distinct and different problem.7
It is said in explanation of the pseudo-territorial postulate of ubiqui-
tous jurisdiction that "A right having been created by the appropriate
law, the recognition of its existence should follow everywhere"" and that
"It is impossible that a single event should be followed by two contra-
dictory consequences; only one law, therefore, can have jurisdiction."9
But a qualification is adopted (at least by Professor Beale) which in
effect concedes the fallibility or falsity of the postulate which asserts
6. Note 4, supra.
7. A clear-sighted English jurist said over fifty years ago: "Looked at from the point
of view of any particular system, Private International Law is that part of the Municipal
Law of each civilized community which is determined by its relation to systems or rules
of law other than its own. It will hardly avail to say, that these extraneous rules are
borrowed from other systems of law; much less that other systems of law or foreign rules
overcome the domestic in the conflict of laws. For it is plain that the whole Private In-
ternational Law of any municipal system is really a substantive part of that system, and
is in no way foreign law or doctrine of general jurisprudence. No part of Private Inter-
national Law has any binding force on an English tribunal, except so far as it is incor-
porated in English decisions. So far it is strict law in Austin's sense of that term. . . . It
is imposed or adopted by the sovereign national authority; it is enforced by the same
process as the rest of the Municipal Law." FRER1CX HARRISON, JVRISPRUDENCE AND TH
Coi-m.rcr or LAws (1919) 104. Published originally in lecture form in 1879. Italics are
those of the author quoted.
8. BEALE, op. cit. supra note 3, at 517, § 47; BEALE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 107.
9. BEA ., op. cit. supra note 3, at 502, § 11.
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the existence of "jurisdictional power" of foreign states or of their
"law" to determine the legal consequences of conflict of laws factual
situations for the state of the forum. To explain the statements which
have been quoted just above and perhaps to account for instances of
adjudications which have not conformed to the postulate, the following
interesting declaration is added, differentiating "enforcement" of a
"right" from its "creation" and its "recognition" and thereby extracting
the concept of enforceability from the concept signified by the term
right:10
"Though a foreign right must be recognized as existing, it does not follow that
it will be given any legal force."" "Since a right can have no legal force unless
it is given force by law, and since nothing can have the force of law in a State
except the law of that State, it follows that no foreign right can be enforced
unless the law of the State so provides. This depends upon the law as to the
enforcement of foreign rights, that is, upon a principle of the Conflict of Laws.
The general principle is, that when a right has once been created by the proper
law it will be enforced everywhere, even where it would not originally have
been created upon the same facts."'1
"But since the enforcement comes through the domestic law, that law may
refuse to give any effect to the right;:1 and though enforcement will not be
denied merely because the creation of the right is opposed to the domestic law,
10. Corbin, Rights and Duties (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 501, 515: "It must be constantly
remembered that in speaking of 'rights' and 'duties' we are not dealing with physical
objects. We are merely stating that somebody's interests will be promoted by legal coer-
cion of another person and that such coercion by societal action is obtainable."
"Is it convenient or necessary to use the term 'right' with such shifting connotation as
sometimes to give it a meaning signifying legal consequences and at other times to with-
draw that meaning, transferring the connotation of legal consequences entirely into the
term 'enforcement'? To speak of a 'right' as being 'created' with respect to a particular
court and then to say that that court must 'recognize' it although the court need not or
will not 'enforce' the so-called 'right' does not seem to be useful . . " Heilman, Arbitra-
tion Agreements and Conflict of Laws (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 617, 643 n.
11. BEAL, op. cit. supra note 3, at 517, § 48.
12. Ibid.
13. Compare: "The most practical and simple statement . . . appears to be that the
forum always 'enforces rights' created by its own 'law' and never 'foreign law' or 'foreign
rights'." Cook, supra note 5, at 478.
"'Rights' being the correlatives of 'duties,' for the nonperformance of which organized
society will inflict disagreeable consequences upon the persons owing the 'duties,' it is im-
possible, of course, to recognize that a party has a legal right in a given state if there are
no remedies available in such state . . ."
"Each organized society, by virtue of its existence as a sovereign, is obliged to define
for itself what rights, duties, privileges, etc., shall attach to the operative facts which
may be presented for determination to its judicial or executive agents, without directions
or suggestions from the organized society within whose territory those facts may have
occurred. Whether the operative facts happened wholly within its territory or partly
or wholly without such territory cannot make any difference." Lorenzen, supra note 4,
20 CoL. L. REsv. 247, 277. Italics supplied.
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it will always be denied where there would be anything illegal in the enforce-
ment itself."' 4
This takes all meaning and jural content out of the pseudo-territorial
postulate.
Moreover, the basic premise for the pseudo-territorial method is con-
ceded to be illusory and not in correspondence with fact, viz:
".. . bywhat law shall it be determined whether the law of a certain country
had the legal power to create an alleged right, since if the right was created
all civilized nations should recognize the fact. Certain jurists say it should
be determined by an alleged international law, upon the terms of which hardly
two of them can agree. Other jurists say that this question should be deter-
mined by the law of the country in whose courts it arises.
"As an actual fact it will of course be determined in accordance with the law
of the forum; since it will be determined by each court in accordance with
that court's understanding of the law, no matter by what name the court calls it.
Why not recognize and admit the truth?"' 5
Professor Beale has also made the following statement:
"To explain the territorial theory in other terms, all that has happened outside
the territory, including the foreign laws which have in some way or other be-
come involved in the problem, is regarded merely as a fact to be considered by
the national law [i.e. of the forum] in arriving at its decision, and to be given
such weight in determining the decision as the national law may choose to
give it."'
1 6
What does this statement do but describe a fact which Professor Cook
and Professor Corbin, respectively, describe in the following extracts
by declaring that the court of the forum, whatever rule it adopts, de-
termines the decision of any conflict of laws case1 7 by an adjudication
of the law of its own state, applying that law, as such, alone:
".. . the forum, when confronted by a case involving foreign elements, always
applies its own law to the case, but in doing so adopts and enforces as its own
law a rule of decision identical, or at least highly similar though not identical,
14. BEAL.E, op. cit. supra note 3, at 518, § 49.
15. BEE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 112. Italics are mine. Cf. CoN-Ficr oF LAws RE-
STATEMENT (Am. L. Inst., Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1930) § 1: "DarnMnoN or CON-
FIcT oF LAws. Conflict of Laws deals with the extent to which the law of a state oper-
ates, and determines whether the law of one or of another state shall be applied to a legal
situation. Comments: a. No state can make a law operative in another state, and the
only law in force in a state is its own law; but by the law of each state, a legal situation
in that state may depend upon the law of some other state or states." Cf. Coticr or
LAWs RESTATEmENT (Am. L. Inst. Proposed Final Draft No. 4, 1934) § 1.
16. BEALE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 106.
17. To the extent that the state of the forum is not subject to federal constitutional
restrictions and, in a sense, even to the extent that it is so subject, i.e., treating such re-
strictions as forming a part of its own law.
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in scope with a rule of decision found in the system of law in force in another
state or country with which some or all of the foreign elements are connected
. . . The forum thus enforces not a foreign right but a right created by its
own law."' 8 "Each jurisdiction, in so far as it is politically independent, can
and does choose the rule that it sees fit, and thus the court of the forum makes
for itself its own law in each case,' 19
Thus the "theoretical territorial" method, better called pseudo-terri-
torial, admittedly builds upon a false foundation in an apparent en-
deavor to construct a system of rules directed exclusively to the singling
out of some one particular state's domestic rule as the superimposed
binding rule, or as the only "proper" or appropriate rule, for application
in the decision of each conflict of laws question presented in each factual
situation. The illusion or fiction that some one particular state has
an exclusive "jurisdictional power" over each conflict of laws situation,
or that its domestic rule or rules are of necessity exclusively applicable
or appropriate thereto, appears to have no utility, even in assisting or
tending to bring about uniformity of decision.20  Inasmuch as it causes
considerations of expediency to be disregarded, it is inevitable that a
method based entirely upon it will more and more result in decisions
which are adverse to such considerations and will ultimately destroy
itself by opposition to them. On the other hand, a method which takes
empirical considerations into account and builds rules along the lines of
economic and social objectives can produce rules which will tend to be
lasting and will accomplish maximum uniformity of legal result along
with maximum production of desired economic and social consequences.
Danger also inheres in the employment of the pseudo-territorial meth-
od in that because of erroneous presuppositions as to the nature of the
function of a court in deciding conflict of laws cases, or because of
mistaken notions as to the court's actual power or lack of power of
adjudication or as to the logical unavoidability of the application of
some particular rule, a court may forbear from making a highly desirable
disposition which it might otherwise have adopted."' The greater the
social importance of the subject-matter involved the more serious is
this risk.
18. Cook, supra note 5, at 469.
19. ANsoN, Con,"rncs (Corbin's ed. 1930) 111.
20. Moreover, the accompanying sleight-of-hand performance of treating the concept
of "right" as separate from any signification of "enforceability" appears to be designed
to keep up the illusion referred to. It certainly tends to promote confusion of thought and
to eliminate examination of the expediential issues involved. See note 10, supra.
21. For an illustration of the jural consequences of acceptance of the fallacious notion
that the so-called lex loci contractus "alone can attach an obligation to the act of making
a promise" in respect of "covenants" in deeds of conveyance of land, see Heilman, Conflict
of Laws Treatment of Interpretation and Construction of Deeds in Reference to Convenants
(1931) 29 Miscr. L. REv. 277, 298.
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For the solution of certain sorts of problems concerning interstate
transactions it might be most satisfactory to adopt conflict of laws rules
requiring the application of the particular domestic rule, of those of
the two or more states concerned, which would have the effect of en-
forcing interstate transactions rather than of rendering them unenforce-
able, or which would have the effect of enforcing them to a greater ex-
tent than would be possible under any one of the differing rules which
might be adopted. The pseudo-territorial attitude would preclude this
possible mode of disposition, on the ground that the rule to be adopted
could not be selected with reference to anything but some single, arbi-
trarily specified territorial connection. On the pseudo-territorial basis
it would be impossible to apply a conflict of laws rule flexibly adapted
with reference to some other phase or element involved, as for example,
enforceability, in addition to reference to the domestic rule or rules of
a particular state with which the transaction had territorial connection.
Employment of such a rule would take account of the territorial extent
or scope of the transaction instead of treating a transaction connected
with two or more states as if it had been confined in its factual elements
to one state alone.
Examples of types of problems in regard to which the possibility of
adoption of flexible rules of the sort described would seem pertinent and
important are those concerning "intrinsic validity' 2 2 or "formal valid-
ity"' 2 of alleged contractual promises or agreements (involving rule of
place of promise or agreement, rule of place of performance, and so
forth), and those concerning "formal validity" of alleged conveyances
of interests in land24 (involving rule of situs, rule of place of execution
of instrument and so forth). If rules of the kind discussed are socially
desirable, it would be pitiful for courts to abstain from applying them
on account of a presupposition that some one intrinsically particular
domestic rule automatically identified on an arbitrary basis must be
applied in each case, regardless of its economic or social effect. It would
seem to be far better in any circumstances that the court in determin-
ing each conflict of laws question should fully realize that it "is making
its own law for each case" and should, therefore, consciously take into
account economic and social factors or elements, including the desidera-
tum of uniformity and consistency of judicial disposition in reference
to these factors or elements, than that it should hide its head in the sand
and imagine that its only responsibility is to single out by deduction
22. Lorenzen, Validity and Effects of Contracts in the Conflict of Laws (1921) 30 YALE
L. J. 565, 655; (1921) 31 YA, L. JT. 53.
23. Lorenzen, The Validity of Wills, Deeds and Contracts as Regards Form (1911) 20
YALE L. 3. 427.
24. Ibid.
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from certain assumed propositions or by abstract reflection the domestic
rule of some particular state as the compelled rule, or as the only proper
or appropriate rule for application. 5
A legal method which articulates, as or in its subject-matter, economic
and other social objectives, should serve much more effectually in their
attainment than one which does not." From this standpoint the pseudo-
territorial method appears to be palpably inadequate, especially in refer-
ence to "contract" factual situations and commercial transactions gen-
erally, and certainly is narrower than the "theoretical" method proper,
as employed by Continental jurists. For although the latter method
does not comprise the particularistic adoption or application of rules on
expeditional grounds in individual cases, it does not exclude the formu-
lation and adoption of premises which state propositions of economic or
sociological content from which conclusions to be applied in the form
of rules may be derived. Of this method, Dicey has said:
"The advantages of the theoretical mode of treatment, when employed by a
man of genius, such as Savigny, are in danger of being underrated by English
lawyers, to whose whole conception of law it is at bottom opposed. It is there-
fore a duty to bring these merits into prominence. The two great merits of the
method are, first, that it keeps before the minds of students the agreement
between the different countries of Europe as to the principles to be adopted for
the choice of law; and next, that it directs notice to the consideration which
English lawyers are apt to forget: that the choice of one system of law rather
than of another for the decision of a particular case is dictated by reasons of
logic, of convenience, or of justice, and is not a matter in any way of mere
fancy or precedent."27
With this statement, the following admonition concerning the sterility
25. ". . . the theory that a particular territorial law is exclusively applicable to a
particular set of operative facts . . . cannot be accepted analytically as a sound basis for
the conflict of laws. Where all the operative facts occur in a single state it may be con-
ceded that as a matter of expediency the rights of the parties should be determined ordinarily
in accordance with the law of such state. But if the forum sees fit it may adopt another
rule .... That there is no logical necessity for the application of any particular rule
selected by Anglo-American law is seen from the fact that different rules with respect to
the same set of facts often prevail in foreign countries. Nor can our rules of the conflict
of laws be explained by any theory of 'territoriality,' other than the general doctrine that
the lav' of the forum selects the rules which shall control. In fact, the only answer that
can be given to the question why the common law has chosen a particular rule to govern
in the conflict of laws or in any other branch of law is that it has seemed to the forum
sound policy to do so." Lorenzen, supra note 13, at 274. Italics are those of the author
quoted.
26. "... a body of law is more rational and more civilized when every rule it contains
is referred articulately and definitely to an end which it subserves, and when the grounds
for desiring that end are stated or are ready to be stated in words." Holmes, The Path of
the Law (1897) 10 HARv. L. REV. 457, 469, COLLECT D LEALa PAPERS (1920) 186.
27. DicEv', op. cit. supra note 1, at 15.
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of the notion of territoriality, or rather pseudo-territoriality, as a source
for the derivation of rules of conflict of laws should be borne in mind:
".. . nothing can be gained by hiding the truth and making it appear that
certain rules govern in the nature of things. Such rules have not been dis-
covered by the theoretical writers of the greatest eminence, nor has a consistent
set of rules been worked out as yet by either the English or the American
courts. The common law has not hidden in its bosom a logical set of rules
which can be derived from its notion of territoriality. Sound progress in this
field of the law, as in all other departments of knowledge, can be made only
if the actual facts be faced which show that the adoption of the one rule or
the other depends entirely upon considerations of policy which each sovereign
state must determine for itself." 28
Although the pseudo-territorial method, as formulated, excludes ex-
pediential considerations from its content it is not to be supposed that
no such considerations have been back of its formulation. In fact, Pro-
fessor Beale has clearly declared that an expediential purpose has mo-
tivated its construction: the purpose of bringing about the "protection"
and "enforcement" of "vested rights." The territorial viewpoint, he
has stated,
.. . asserts that no law can exist as such except the law of the land; but that
it is a principle of every civilized law that vested rights shall be protected, and
therefore that in each country it is sought to find what rights have arisen any-
where, and to recognize them, applying in all else the law of the land to every
question.
'29
In considering this declaration of juristic aim and the purposes of the
pseudo-territorial method as they have been delimited in the formulation
of the postulates and corollaries which have been adopted as its content,
it is necessary for complete analysis to observe that there are two main
types of conflicts of laws factual situations and that they differ funda-
mentally, radically, from each other: (1) those in which all of the facts
treated as operative have taken place within and pertain to one state
alone, (2) those in which all of the facts treated as operative have not
taken place within or do not pertain to one state alone. The failure to
treat these separately in consideration of their difference, or the attempt
to treat them in the same way or ways despite the difference, is a crucial
fallacy and defect of the pseudo-territorial method. This non-differen-
tiation makes the method radically non-territorial30 in reference to situ-
ations of the second type, to the extent that the territorial connection
between only one state and a particular specified element of the factual
situation is given sole consideration to the exclusion of the territorial
28. Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws (1924) 33 YxAL
L. J. 736, 745.
29. BEALE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 63.
30. i.e., in addition to the respect stated above at note 5, supra.
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connection between any other state, or states, and any other element
or elements of the factual situation.
When a suit involving the first type of situation has been brought
in another state than that in which the operative facts occurred, it is al-
together natural and reasonable and, it would seem, extremely desirable,
that the court of the state of the forum should generally adopt for ap-
plication, to as great an extent as possible, the same rule or rules that
the courts of the state of the factual situation would presumably have
applied had the case in question been brought to litigation in the latter
state." To apply such a rule or rules is sufficiently reasonable to re-
move all justification for resorting to some artificial explanation of this
result. However, what the pseudo-territorialists have done has been
to carry over to situations of the second type, i.e. those in which the
operative facts have taken place in or pertain to different states, the
sort of explanation applied by them to the first type of situations. They
rest the explanation upon the basic postulate that as to any and all factual
situations there is but one state or country the domestic rules of which
can or appropriately may be applied to determine any question, and
treat that state or country alone as having so-called conflict of laws
jurisdiction. With this postulate they combine a corollary that only
the law, i. e. domestic rules, of the state (or states) in which persons
act can bind them.2 In situations of the first type, the application of
the postulate and corollary places the transaction under the domestic
rules of the state in which the behavior of all the parties concerned
occurred. This result seems to the pseudo-territorialists to vindicate
both propositions. In situations of the second type, however, their ap-
plication will not accomplish the desideratum adopted in the postulate;
for the actions of the various parties to the transactions have not taken
place in the same state. To bridge this analytical gap, the pseudo-
territorialists have evolved fictions by means of which they treat all
operative acts as if they had occurred in the particular state the domestic
rules of which are applied. For example, a tortfeasor is regarded as com-
mitting his wrongful act in the state in which the injury is received.
33
31. See Lorenzen, note 25, supra.
32. BEALE, op. cit. supra note 3, at 515, § 41: "Rights being created by law alone, it is
necessary in every case to determine the law by which a right is created. The creation
of a personal obligation, which has no situs and results from some act of the party bound,
is a matter which has to do with those acts. A personal obligation, then, is created by the
law of the place where the acts are done out of which the obligation arises.' See also, as
to torts, id. 539, § 86; as to contracts, id. 541, § 90.
33. i.e., although the tortious conduct of the defendant takes place in another state. See
Cook, supra note 5, at 466. Cf. CoNrcT oF LAWS RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst., Proposed
Final Draft No. 3, 1932) §§ 411-418 A; id. (Proposed Final Draft No. 4, 1934) §§ 411-
418 A. The differing English treatment is recognized. BEAE, loc. cit. supra note 32. As
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And where contract cases are concerned, definitions of "the place of
making the contract" have been framed so as to include factual situations
the elements of which have not been confined to a single state or country.
Thus a contract is regarded as having been made in the state in which
occurred the last act or event treated as necessary to constitute it a
"binding obligation."3 4 In this way the actions of the parties are treated
as if they had taken place wholly within the state in which such last act
or event occurred,3 5 although there is nothing inherently more important,
essential or vital about the last act or event than about the first or the
aggregate of all the other preceding acts or events.36
to deviation from the usual American mode of treatment see Stumberg, Conflict of Laws-
Torts-Texas Decisions (1930) 9 Tmx. L. Rav. 21. As to torts generally, see Lorenzen, Tort
Liability and the Conflict of Laws (1931) 47 LAw Q. REV. 483.
34. Br.LE, op. cit. supra note 3, at 540, § 87. Cf. CoNFLxcr or LAWS RESTATE ENT
(Am. L. Inst., Proposed Final Draft No. 2, 1931) §§ 332-353 and corresponding sections of
Proposed Final Draft No. 4, 1934.
35. CoN]FLicT OF LAWS RESTATEMIENT, op. cit. supra note 34, § 333: "PLACE WHERE
LAST ACT DoNE. The place of contracting is in the state in which the last event necessary.
to make a contract occurs." There can of course be no such "last necessary act or event"
the specification of which can be worked out, if the states of the factual situation of the
transaction differ by their domestic rules concerning what constitutes such final requisite
act or event. But in spite of this difference the court (i.e. the forum), by a necessarily
arbitrary selection, can designate a certain act or event as the last necessary one to the
transaction in question, in accordance with the domestic rule of the forum or of a domestic
rule of any other state. However, designation in accordance with a rule of some state
other than that of the forum or of one connected with the factual situation of the transac-
tion in question would be unlikely. In Proposed Final Draft No. 4, 1934, Section 333 is
omitted; but the comment under Section 332 of that Draft provides "d. Determination of
'place of contracting'. Under its Conflict of Laws rules, in determining the place of con-
tracting, the forum ascertains the place in which, under the general law of Contracts, the
last event necessary to make a contract occurs. . . ." Section 332 reads "PLACE OF CON-
TRACTiNG. The law of the forum decides as a preliminary question by the law of which
state questions arising concerning the formation of a contract are to be determined and
this state is, in the Restatement of this Subject, called the 'place of contracting'."
36. In the case of a unilateral contract between parties who have acted in different
states, the "place of contracting" is not the place where the promisor who is sought to be
bound acted, but it is the place where the promisee performed his act of acceptance.
In the place of a bilateral alleged contract, the "place of contracting" is the place where
the defendant promisor who is sought to be held bound acted, only if his promise was
made subsequently to that of the plaintiff promisor so as to be the consummating act of
the alleged contract, i.e., acceptance. If the defendant promisor was the offeror and
the plaintiff promisor was the offeree, by the "last act test" the "place of contracting"
will have to be that place in which the latter acted. And in cases involving agency re-
lationships a principal may be held bound by an undertaking of his agent under the do-
mestic rule of the state in which the agent made the undertaking, although the principal
himself was not even in the state. Resort to treatment of an alleged principal as if he
himself had acted in a state in which an alleged agent of his had acted presents difficulty
as a device of convenience only when there is difference between the domestic rule or rules
of the state in which the principal acted and those of the state in which the agent acted,
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When the screen provided by fictions of this sort is removed, the basic
pseudo-territorial postulate reveals itself to be plainly unsuited for the
more complex and essentially differing types of situations in which the
operative facts have not been localized. However, this unsuitability has
been hidden not only by the fictions above noted, but also by the suita-
bility of the postulate where simpler types of situations are concerned:
those in which all of the operative facts have happened in and pertain
to one state only. The pseudo-territorialists either have been carried
away by the plausibility of the postulate when considered in its applica-
tion to factual situations localized within a single state so that they have
failed to observe its obvious unsuitability for unlocalized factual situa-
tions, or else have employed its plausibility in reference to the former
to camouflage its inapplicability and unsuitability in reference to the
latter.
It is conspicuously important to notice that this non-differentiation is
opposed to the juristic objective apparently indicated by the declaration
that "vested rights shall be protected" 37 and that therefore the courts
should attempt "to find what rights have arisen anywhere and to recog-
nize them." " Clearly, unless the quoted statement is confined in appli-
cation to a factual situation localized within one state or country, it de-
parts from the pseudo-territorial method, if recognition of a right is
treated as having anything to do with its enforcement. Unless the quoted
statement is applied beyond the localized type of factual situation it
amounts to no more than an expression that as to such a situation the
rules of the state in which the facts have happened and to which they
pertain ought to be applied wherever the factual situation may be brought
to litigation. This, as has been said above, is too obviously sensible and
desirable to be argued about. Apparently the quoted statement is de-
signed to express a larger idea, viz: that in an interstate factual situa-
tion, if the domestic rules of any of the states in which any of the opera-
tive facts took place or with which any of them were connected would
as to whether or not in a domestic case involving facts corresponding to those of the
conflict of laws case, the alleged agent would be treated as "agent," i.e., legally representa-
tive, of the alleged principal, so that the acts of the former would be treated as if they
had been the acts of the latter in his legal relations with a third person. The same is also
true, it would seem, when there is difference between the domestic rule or rules of the
states where agent and principal acted, and such rule or rules of the state in which the
third person acted, if he acted in a third state. All of these instances contradict the
theory that one can be contractually bound only by application of the domestic rule of
the state in which he has acted. For the points covered by this note and the statement to
which it is appended, I am indebted, as pupil to master, to Professor W. W. Cook; and this
is only a very small portion, indeed, of my debt to him.
37. Note 29, supra.
33. Ibid. (Italics are mine.)
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recognize a "right" (i. e. enforce a claim) had all the facts treated as
operative happened in and been connected with that state, then every
other state should treat a similar or corresponding conflict of laws "right"
as existing, i. e. should treat a claim as similarly or coextensively enforce-
able and enforce it if occasion is presented for doing so. 9 Obviously
such an aim in reference to conflict of laws situations which are not con-
fined to a single state is contrary to the basic pseudo-territorial postulate
that for any given factual ituation the domestic rule or rules of only one
state, identifiable exclusively on the basis of the territorial incidence or
connection of some arbitrarily selected factual element, can be or should
be applied; for, by the postulate, the rules of every other state are ex-
cluded from application. ° This inconsistency is illustrated by Professor
39. This would seem to be practically workable in reference to alleged "contract"
claims, though not in reference to alleged "tort" claims. Using the term "claim" here as
meaning the assertion of a "right," in the sense that a "duty" is treated as correlated with
the latter, suppose that in a given "tort" situation the operative facts have been distributed
between States X and Y and that under the State X local rule the plaintiff would have
a right and the defendant a duty for the violation of which the plaintiff would have
been entitled to damages had the factual situation taken place wholly within State X,
but that under the state Y local rule the plaintiff would have had no such right and the
defendant would have had a privilege of doing as he has done in the conflict of laws
case presented in a court of State Z. To the defendant the privilege which he would have
had according to the local rule of State Y is no less important and valuable for him than
the right which the plaintiff would have had according to the local rule of State X would
be for the plaintiff. Therefore, there would seem to be no sensible justification for en-
forcing a right in favor of the plaintiff by applying the State X rule than for enforcing
a privilege in favor of the defendant by applying the State Y rule. In contrast, alleged
"contract" claims represent and in most instances correspond with promises or undertakings
assumed, which have. apparently created in the persons to whom they have been made
reasonable expectations of their fulfillment. This it is felt furnishes not only a justification
but an urgent reason for rather enforcing a right for a plaintiff promisee than a privilege
for a defendant promisor in an alleged conflict of laws "contract" factual situation. On
the same basis, i.e., that of effectuation of undertakings to the extent of their having ap-
parently created reasonable expectation or reliance, a privilege purported to be created
by the agreement for the extinguishment of a right should, it would seem, be judicially
established. So, of powers and inmunities, also. The duties, no-rights, liabilities and
disabilities correlative with rights, privileges, powers and immunities would, of course,
correlatively become and be treated as existent with them, respectively. As between two
or more states, both or all giving some legal effect in domestic factual situations cor-
responding to those raising problems in conflict of laws factual situations, to promises,
undertakings or stipulations, but giving such effect variantly as between those states, it
would seem not impracticable to apply the domestic rule or rules of that state which by
such rule or rules would give the greater or greatest effect to a promise, undertaking or
stipulation in a "contract" factual situation.
40. "Not only must every political society have some law, but it must have only one
law. If two laws prevailed at the same time, they might be mutually destructive. It is
impossible that a single event should be followed by two contradictory consequences. Only
one law, therefore, can have jurisdiction." BEALE, op. cit. supra note 3, at 502, § 11. Ap-
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Beale's own expressions. In connection with the extract quoted just
below it should be borne in mind that by a rule of convenience in Anglo-
American law a "contractual" agreement is usually treated as having
been made in that state in which the last operative fact happened which
was necessary for a "contract ' 4' according to the requisites existing in
common under the domestic rules of the different states with which the
factual situation was connected. This treatment has been adopted into
the pseudo-territorial method. Both or all of the parties are treated as
if all their acts had been done where the last act took place which sup-
plied the last necessary operative fact. In discussing the so-called rule
of "the place of contracting" in contrast with the rule of the place of
performance, Professor Beale has said:
"In all these cases the matter must, it seems, be determined theoretically by
the law governing the transaction, i. e., by the law of the place where the
parties act in making their agreement. If by that law their acts have no legal
efficacy, then no other state can give them greater effect. If by the law of that
state their acts created a binding obligation upon the parties, then the parties
who have acted under that law must be bound by it."2
42
Against the background of the foregoing analysis and discussion the
following declarations by Professor Beale would seem to be of interest:
"Instead of the Dutch theory of comity, the common law has worked out indi-
genously a theory of vested rights, which serves the same purpose [as the theory
of comity], that is, the desire to reach a just result, and is not subject to the
objections which can be urged against the doctrine of comity.43  Story accepted
and developed this theory, which from his time has been the accepted theory
in the English and American courts."144
parently it is not meant that "the only one law" which any political society can have
is its own, i.e., that of the state or country of the forum, but that with reference to a
particular event there can be only one law applicable, i.e., with "jurisdiction," for every
possible forum in the world and irrespective of whether or not the factual situation is
confined within the state or country in which the "event" happens or has happened.
Compare with these quoted statements and with the statements quoted at note 15, supra,
the following ones: "Since there can be but one law in a place, it follows that every
question there arising must be determined by the law of that place. A foreign law must
there be merely a fact . . ." BFArx op. cit. supra note 3, at 504, § 14. "Whenever a
question arises concerning the recognition or enforcement of a right which, it is claimed,
accrued in another State (a question of the Conflict of Laws) it must therefore be solved
by the law of the State in which the question arises. The principles of the Conflict of
Laws, in other words, form part of the common law of each State." Ibid. § 15.
41. See note 35, supra.
42. Beale, What Law Governs the Validity of a Contract (1909-10) 23 HMav. L. REv.
1, 79, 194, 260 at 268. At pp. 270-271, the author quotes substantially all of the extract
from Section 90 of the Summary in his casebook cited above in note 3, supra.
43. BEALE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 105. Italics are mine.
44. Ibid. See the acute constructive criticism by Beach, who disputes Beale's state-
ment that "the American courts have adopted the territorial theory of the conflict of laws,
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These statements have real significance only if they describe an aim
broader than the mere purpose of treating "rights" as "vested" in refer-
ence to factual situations localized within but one state, and also broader
than the project to which the pseudo-territorial method is limited in ref-
erence to interstate factual situations. The results of the decisions in the
aggregate, as well as the articulated disclosures of the aims of the courts
in rendering these decisions, strongly contradict that any "theory of
vested rights," limiting the courts strictly to uniform employment of the
domestic rules of some one particular state arbitrarily specified solely
on the basis of territorial factual incidence or connection, has become
established in the "contract" field of conflict of laws jurisprudence. With
the possible but doubtful qualification that in regard to questions of "for-
mal validity"' an approach to uniformity in application of "the rule of
the place of contracting" may have been reached, no single rule described
in terms of factual incidence or connection has been established as a gen-
eral rule in interstate "contract" cases of any sort. Nor can the courts
be shown to have become strait-jacketed or to have felt strait-jacketed
generally concerning the employment of any rule depending upon the
connection of a specified kind of operative fact with a particular state.
Professor Beale's own conclusions after investigation support the state-
ments made just above. Concerning questions of "the intrinsic validity
of contracts," Professor Lorenzen has said:4
"A few years ago Professor Beale undertook the laborious task of examining
in detail the English and American cases on this subject.4 7 It appears from
his article that our law is in a state of great confusion and that the courts of
the same state often follow different theories. By way of general summary
Professor Beale concluded that at the time of writing six states, one of which
was doubtful, had adopted the law of the place of making; that 16 states, of
which 5 were doubtful, had adopted the law of the place of performance;
and that 11 states, besides the District of Columbia, had adopted the law in-
tended by the parties.48 The federal courts have generally applied the law of
the state or country intended by the parties. Some of them have presumed that
the parties intended their contract to be governed by the law of the place of
making; others, by that of the place of performance." 49
Even as to so-called questions of "formal validity" the following obser-
vation has been made some time ago:
instead of the Dutch theory of comity." Beach, Uniform Interstate Enforceinent of Vested
Rights (1918) 27 YA. L. J. 656. "The doctrine of the ex comitate extra-territorial opera-
tion of law, as law, is entirely discredited by modern scholarship." Id. at 664.
45. See note 23, supra.
46. Lorenzen, supra note 22, 30 YAsL L. J. at 565.
47. Beale, supra note 42.
48. Id. at 207.
49. Id. at 100-103.
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"It cannot be said that the English and American cases have definitely adopted
the lex loci as determining the validity of contracts as regards form, with the
qualification that, where under the general rules of the forum governing the
validity of contracts in general some other law is applicable, the contract may
conform also in the matter of form to such other law."' 0
No theory has been applied with uniformity which accords enforcement
to a "right," as "vested" in an interstate factual situation, only if a simi-
lar right to that claimed would exist by the law of an arbitrarily desig-
nated territorially-specified state, in a corresponding but hypothetical
domestic factual situation. Not only have the courts generally avoided
an objective of such a restricted and restrictive character, but actually the
decisions, it is believed, reveal that the predominant endeavor of the
courts is to attach legal operativeness to interstate transactions and there-
by effect their economic consummation in spite of differences between
states as to the enforceability of similar domestic transactions. This has
been accomplished by employment of the particular domestic rule or
rules, of those in force in the various states with which elements of the
factual situation are connected, which in their application will produce
enforceability or the closest possible approach to enforceability. Clearly
this objective is economic, beyond being merely legal; the judicial dis-
position is treated as the solution of an economic as well as of a legal
problem. The decision is used as an instrumentality for the realization
of the desired and anticipated economic consequences of transactions,
notwithstanding the existence of local rules for domestic transactions the
employment of which in application to conflict of laws factual situations
would prevent that realization. It is submitted that this legal-economic
objective ought generally to be adopted and adhered to for interstate
"contractual" transactions. It might then be possible to obliterate rules
which rest merely upon the fortuitous element of the territorial inci-
dence or connection of some artificially designated fact, isolated from the
aggregate of the facts, and bearing no distinctive relation to the case in
regard to economic and social consequences.
The adoption of such an objective would not invariably require the
employment of a rule by which the fullest possible enforceability is
attached to interstate transactions. Exceptions may be needed, as for
example, in cases involving usury." Generally, however, rules achieving
maximum enforceability should be employed. The courts appear to be
50. Lorenzen, supra note 23, at 442.
51. See Note (1921) 21 CoL. L. REv. 585. However, the objective under discussion has
been very generally adopted in usury cases. See Stumberg, Conflict of Laws-Validity of
Contracts-Texas Cases (1932) 10 TEx. L. REV. 163, 184. But transactions of possibly




tacitly striving for enforceability. Their efforts to avoid holding promises
unenforceable have been conspicuous in the many decisions which employ
the rationale that where possible that state's domestic rule is to be applied
which the parties presumably intended should be applied. In many of
these cases, the rules of some state which otherwise would not have con-
flict of laws "jurisdiction," have been presumed by the courts to be those
which the parties intended to be applied, even though no indication of
the existence of such an intention has appeared. Such attributed or
imputed intention, Professor Cook has very aptly called "nominal
intention."
It should be borne in mind, moreover, that even where the courts have
adopted some territorial rule, such as the rule of place of contracting,
rule of place of performance, and so forth, without employing any ex-
planatory basis of actual or presumed intention of the parties, they have
often succeeded in holding the alleged contractual promise enforceable.
It is possible that in a substantial portion of these cases the rule employed
was adopted in order to enforce the agreement and not because the court
concluded that the rule was appropriate in itself.
Even for one who does not believe in a viewpoint which deliberately
shuts out economic or other social objectives as factors to be considered
in the judicial process, or who does not regard the processes of Conflict
of Laws as more essentially deductive than those of intra-municipal law,
it is not unnatural to assume superficially that a problem of Conflict of
Laws involves nothing more than making a selection in some way between
differing but equally desirable local rules. That each possible rule under
consideration has been adopted as a domestic rule of at least one state
indicates that each is or has been considered of value as such a rule. If
these differing local rules are presented on an equal footing in conflict
of laws cases, there is danger that their economic and social effects in
operation as conflicts of laws rules may be overlooked. It must always
be remembered that owing to interstate considerations, one rule may be
clearly more desirable for application to a conflict of laws situation al-
though each different domestic rule may be the best that could be adopted
for local application in the state in which it exists.
Possibly as to international conflict of laws cases generally the problem
52. ". . . the question of intent can hardly be said to involve the actual mental opera-
tions of the parties, for, as a matter of fact, they probably did not stop to consider what
was the legal effect of their agreement, or whether there was any diversity in the law of
. . . two states; and, therefore, when we speak of the 'question of intent' we are making
use of what might be termed a 'legal fiction' . . ." Grand v. Livingston, 4 App. Div. 589,
595, 38 N. Y. Supp. 490, 494 (1896). See DICEy, op. cit. supra note 1, at 625. To the
effect that the English courts similarly use the term "proper law of a contract" as an ex-
planatory device, see DIcEy, id. at 591. Cf. WESTLAKE, PMATE INTERNATIONAL LAw
(7th ed. 1925) 302. On the "intention theory" in England and the United States, see
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of judicial decision satisfactorily may be confined to trying to adopt in
each case such a disposition as can be applied uniformly with the most
simplicity and legal certainty, without comparative weighing of the spe-
cific effects which each of the differing domestic rules would produce in
actual application in individual instances or in the aggregate. In such
cases no concern need be felt as to whether or not, for example, a rule
the application of which would effect enforcement of a particular kind
of transaction, would, in the aggregate of instances, work better than a
rule the application of which would result in non-enforcement. However,
the greater the frequency of the kind of international transaction in ques-
tion the less sound would these observations be. Certainty of predicta-
bility of the judicial fate of transactions (i. e. legal certainty), it should
be noted, is ultimately an economic desideratum. The following com-
ments would seem to have their greatest possible weight where interna-
tional transactions are concerned, but their cogency varies inversely with
the frequency of occurrence of such transactions:
"The most practical use of a rule of law is to enable individuals to avoid a
breach of the law, a dispute, and an expensive litigation. In short, the first
test of the practicability of a rule of law is its certainty and the ease with which
it can be stated to parties by counsel in advising them, in advance of action,
upon the legality of their contemplated acts. In determining the rules for the
validity of a contract it must be borne in mind that what the parties desire is to
learn in advance whether their intended agreement would be a valid one, how
it should be made, and what its effect would be."
'53
"In many situations in the Conflict of Laws, where there are no social or eco-
nomic considerations of a decisive character, the task of choosing the proper
rule becomes extremely difficult. Whether the local rule shall be applied in
these cases or some 'foreign' rule will have to be determined as best it may in
the light of analogy and the experience and practice of other states or nations.
Lorenzen, supra note 22, 30 YALE L. J. at 576. As to oral "acceptances" of bills of ex-
change, see LoRNzEN, TME CoN'Licr Or LAWS RELATING TO BILs AND NoTEs (1919)
87-90.
53. Beale, supra note 42, at 264. A rule may from its terms appear to have greater
certainty of application than proves to be the case in its actual employment on account
of great variation among the types of factual situations in which it may be applied.
Consider the following comment concerning the rule of the "place of contracting": ". . . the
forum, having adopted the place-of-making rule, gives it content by designating the
event which must occur at a particular place to make it the place of making. In the very
nature of things, because of the variety of kinds of contracts, such as formal and informal,
unilateral and bilateral, or because of the diversity of means of negotiations, such as
agents, correspondence, etc., 'the event' is not always the same but varies so that the
place of making instead of being determined by a constant content becomes a general term
to designate places with which particular events have sufficient connection to give, accord-




In these instances, it matters less what the rule is than that it should be certain
and so far as possible uniform.' ' 4
On the other hand, in cases presenting problems of Conflict of Laws
among the states of a federal country the close and vital interconnections
created by the constant flow of transactions of great value to individuals
and to communities, may require the consideration of factors other than
certainty of predictability of legal consequences by lawyers.? Beyond
legal uniformity of consequence, it may be necessary to consider how far
the adoption of particular rules in conflict of laws cases would result in
uniformity of the sorts of economic consequences most generally or most
strongly desired. It may be conceivable that courts could succeed in
working out uniform conflict of laws rules by which in each type of "con-
tract" case some particular domestic rule would be applicable because of
the territorial incidence of a particular kind of fact, so that a competent
lawyer could safely and with assurance advise the parties as to the law
which would affect their prospective transaction. But even if this be
assumed, it is nevertheless a fact that in reference to many matters in-
volved in economic transactions, local differences between states as to
"validity" essentials, both of the "intrinsic" and the "formal" sorts, are
of such petty kinds, and the considerations back of local rules which
oppose enforcement are of so much less importance than enforceability
is to the parties and to the public, that these petty differences between
local rules should not be permitted to prevent the enforcement of agree-
ments and the realization of the expectations based upon them in inter-
state transactions Accordingly, it should be considered whether or not it
would be desirable to adopt a conflict of laws rule or set of rules which
would have the maximum consequences of contractual enforceability of
promises in respect to "intrinsic validity", "formal validity" and so-called
"effects." 6
If this is desirable, then the rule or rules adopted should be stated as
simply and directly as possible in terms of description of the very objec-
tive sought, viz: maximum contractual enforcement of promises. The
following statement of such a rule is proposed:
The formal validity, the intrinsic validity, or the extent of the enforceability
or effect of any alleged contractual promise or undertaking, other than one con-
cerning an interest in land, shall be determined by applying that rule, of the
domestic rules of the states in which operative facts57 of the factual situation of
54. Lorenzen, supra note 28, at 750.
55. And the same observations would no doubt be applicable or nearly as applicable
in reference to differences of domestic rules of nations closely situated with respect to
each other and closely connected commercially.
56. See discussion at note 67, infra.
57. "Operative, constitutive, causal, or dispositive facts are those which, under the
general legal rules that are applicable, suffice to change legal relations, that is, either to
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the transaction concerned have happened or with which such operative facts are
connected, 58 which, if applied, will have the consequence of attaching validity
or the maximum enforcement or effect to the promise or undertaking in ques-
tion,' 9 subject to the qualification that in any case in which there is both a
problem of intrinsic validity and a further problem of extent of enforcement or
effect of a promise or undertaking (if held contractually valid, i. e. operative)
or a further problem of any other kind, the further problem shall be treated as
subsidiary and its solution shall be determined by applying the domestic rule or
rules of the same state as are applied to determine the solution of the former
problem.60
The following rule is also proposed:
To determine the effect upon a contract, other than one concerning an inter-
est in land, of a transaction or fact subsequent to the transaction of the making
of the contract,61 there shall be applied the domestic rule or rules of that state,
of the states in which or with which operative facts of the factual situation of
the transaction of the making of the contract have taken place or are connected,
which by its domestic rule or rules would give the greatest operative effect to
such a subsequent transaction or fact had this transaction or fact and the tran-
saction of the making of the. contract taken place in and been connected solely
with that state.
6 2
create a new relation, or to extinguish an old one, or to perform both of these functions
simultaneously." HoHELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS (1923) 32. The operative
facts in a conflict of laws factual stuation include each fact which, in a domestic case of
the sort presented, would be operative in any of the states with which the factual situation
is connected. They also include the domestic rules of those states. See BEALE, op. cit.
supra note 2, at 106.
58. E.g., fact of contemplated place of performance.
59. Questions of contractual "capacity" would be treated as questions of intrinsic
validity under the rule now proposed; it is suggested that the fact of the place of domicil
of the person whose "capacity" is in question perhaps should be treated as an operative
fact.
60. "The contract," if held to exist, should be treated as much as possible as an en-
tirety in respect of its legal characteristics. To prevent incongruity of treatment, if two
or more legal characteristics of "the contract" are involved, the same system or aggre-
gate of rules, consistent between or among themselves, should be applied when that can
be done. Consistency and compatibility can be assured most completely if domestic rules
of the same state are applied whenever possible where two or more conflict of laws
questions have to be determined in reference to one transaction.
61. For example, a transaction or fact alleged to have effected assignment, modification,
rescission or discharge, etc.
62. See note 60, supra. The rule or rules of the state or states in which the subsequent
transaction or fact has happened or taken place, as for example in the case of an alleged
assignment or discharge, are excluded for the following reasons: (1) because the problem
involved is properly treated not as being what effect shall the subsequent transaction or
fact have in itself, independently of the original contract transaction, but whether by
reason of that original transaction a contract was made which was or should be treated
as subject to being affected by a subsequent transaction or fact of the kind in question,
e.g., whether the contract right or rights were created as assignable or not and created
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The following rule is submitted for contractual transactions concerning
interests in land:
All questions concerning alleged contracts which pertain to interests in land
shall be determined by applying the rule or rules of the state of the situs of the
land.
The first of the proposed rules does not differ essentially from the first
proposition of the following rules which have been suggested by Professor
Lorenzen for disposition of problems of "intrinsic validity," viz:
".. . 1. That the intrinsic validity of contracts should be recognized if the
local law of any state with which the contract has a substantial connection be
satisfied. 2. That such contracts be regarded as invalid, a. if their execution
is prohibited by some stringent policy of the place of contracting; b. if their
performance is illegal under the law of the place of performance."0 3
Professor Lorenzen's second proposition is not included in the rule now
proposed. If the agreement is one which is localized within one state as
to the entire factual situation, including the fact of the place of perform-
ance, but suit has been brought in another state, the rule now proposed
would have the same effect as Professor Lorenzen's second proposition;
for the proposed rule applies the domestic rule of the state where the
contract was executed, if all the other factual elements of the transac-
tion likewise occurred in that state. But if the agreement is one as to,
which, although all the operative facts of its making have happened
in one state, the performance was or is to take place in another state,
the application of Professor Lorenzen's second proposition will not pro-
duce the same result as the proposed rule; for the proposed rule will
sometimes give enforcement despite invalidity under the law of the place
of execution. Where performance is thus to occur in a different state,
there is no more reason for applying a rule of the place of agreement
as assignable or not by such a subsequent transaction as the one which took place;
(2) because it should be determined and be possible to know as soon as a contract is
made what kind and how much of a contract it is. This concerns not only the extent of
its enforceability and what will constitute full performance, but whether the contract
rights are assignable or not, how otherwise than by performance the contract (as a set
of legal relations) can be discharged, etc. It should not be necessary to wait for a sub-
sequent transaction or fact to occur to see where it took place in order to be able to
ascertain its effect upon the contract legal relations. The entire aggregate of contract
legal relations, not only the right-duty and privilege-no-right relations but the power-
liability and immunity-disability relations regarding the changing of the right-duty and
privilege-no-right relations by assignment, discharge, etc., should be established by the
transaction of the original making of the contract and be ascertainable on the basis of
the operative facts of that transaction, which include the facts as to what the domestic
contract rules of those states are with which that transaction is connected.
63. Lorenzen, supra note 22, 30 YALE L. J. at 673.
[Vol. 43
OBJECTIVES IN CONFLICT OF LAWS
which would invalidate than for applying a rule of the place of perform-
ance, if necessary to validate the transaction contractually. 4
As to questions of "formal validity," Professor Lorenzen has recom-
mended that "the law otherwise determining the existence of a legal act
should control also its formal requirements"; that "compliance with the
lex loci shall be regarded as sufficient" except in the case of commercial
paper, where "compliance with the requirements of form of the place of
issue should be obligatory, subject to the qualifications suggested by
the English Bills of Exchange Act"; that "inasmuch as the law should
be liberal in matters relating to mere form, contracts . . . should be
regarded as valid if they satisfy the lex fori ..... , There is much
merit in this proposal that fulfillment of the formal requisites of the lex
fori should be held sufficient even though the requirements of no other
rules of local law have been satisfied. The day of formalism in law is
passing if it is not over. The only possible objection would seem to
be that in cases in which formal validity was forced to depend solely
upon the rule of the forum, there would be uncertainty as to formal
validity or invalidity until suit had been brought, thereby determining the
location of the forum. However, under this rule there would be at least a
chance of saving the enforceability of a promise or agreement. More-
over, a claimant could enforce the agreement by suing in a state having a
local rule by which the agreement would be upheld as valid, provided that
he could get proper service upon the party sought to be sued.
64. If the agreement is not one in which all of the operative facts of its making have
happened in one state but is such that one of two or more states in which the totality of
these facts have happened is treated as the "place of contracting" by application of the
"last act test," there is still less reason for applying the rule of that state. And the fact
that the effect of applying its rule would invalidate the transaction when the effect of
applying the rule of the other state or states with which the operative facts are connected
would validate it, would seem to make the application of the so-called rule of the "place
of contracting" more unjustified. Especially would this be true if besides the operative
facts of the agreement as such having happened in two different states the place of per-
formance were to be in a third state.
In a case of this sort, the point of difference between an interstate and an intrastate
transaction, which the pseudo-territorial method leaves out of consideration, is important.
Since the prohibitory rule in question relates to performance of domestic transactions
it does not have a priori application to interstate transactions. Likewise, a policy as to a
domestic aggregate of facts is not as such a policy as to an interstate aggregate of facts.
Conceivably there may reasonably be a policy of one kind in a particular state with
reference to an intrastate transaction and a different policy as to a similar interstate trans-
action. For the court of a state other than that of the place of performance to apply the
conflict of laws policy and rule of the place of performance would be to apply renvoi (see
note 4, supra), but this does not signify that that state's domestic policy and rule are
necessarily applicable just because, under the terms of the agreement sought to be enforced,
performance was to take place in that state.
65. Lorenzen, supra note 23, at 461-462.
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Professor Lorenzen has also proposed certain alternative rules for
the determination of contractual "effects," viz:
"(1) The effects of contracts are governed by the law of any state chosen
by the parties. (2) If the intention of the parties is not expressed, the effects
of contracts shall be governed by the law of the specified place of performance.
(3) If the intention of the parties does not appear and no place of performance
is specified the law of the place of contracting shall control. (4) The law so
governing determines not only the primary rights and duties arising from the
contract but also the secondary rights arising from its breach. However, the
legal rate of interest for the non-payment of money shall be determined by
the law of the place of payment. (5) The mode of performance is governed
by the law and usages of the place of performance. (6) Where the effect of
a contract depends upon the meaning of certain terms designating the price,
weight, or measure, or the time of performance, reference shall be had to the
terminology of the place of performance, unless it appears from the circum-
stances that the parties used them in a different sense." 66
Insofar as a question of "effect" is one of extent of enforceability of
a promise or undertaking (or of so-called extent of "obligation," some-
times called simply a question of "obligation") there would seem to be
no weighty reason for not determining the question by the same mode
as a question of intrinsic validity and so, by applying the domestic rules
of the states in which the operative facts have happened or with which
they are connected, to effect maximum enforceability or maximum con-
sequences. Here the question is how much enforcement there shall be.
The question of "validity" is whether there shall be any enforcement
at all or not. In this connection it should be noted that frequently if
not in most instances in which the issue of "validity" or "invalidity"
is determined, what is actually decided is not merely whether or not
any "validity" shall be attached to a promise but whether the promise
shall be held altogether "invalid," or shall be held fully "valid." There
seems to be no sense in applying a different rule if the issue is between
total invalidity and partial validity than if it is between partial validity
and entire validity.67
As to "performance," where there are differences of legal rules between
states regarding what "performance" shall constitute, complete fulfill-
66. Lorenzen, supra note 22, 31 YALE L. J. at 72.
67. This might be otherwise stated in terms of effect, viz.: as between (1) no effect
or full (or fullest possible) effect, (2) no effect or partial effect, (3) partial effect or full
(or fullest possible) effect. These alternatives are reducible to: (1) no effect or some
effect, (2) more, or less effect-to be attached. The latter alternative is what is generally
signified by the term "effect" as differentiated from the former alternative which is
classified as signifying "validity" or "invalidity.' The mere difference of concept thus
signified is not sufficient in itself to require or to justify the employment of two or more
different rules instead of applying the same rule for both classes of questions.
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ment of a duty held to have been created by the making of a particular
kind of promise (sometimes called a question of "obligation" or kind
of "obligation"), the question involved is really what the duty created
shall be held to be and what its extent shall be held to be. Where more
is required of the promisor by the rule of one state than by the rules
of another or others, as constituting "performance," i.e. complete ful-
fillment of duty, the difference is clearly of less or greater enforceability
and so can be and should be dealt with as such under the rule proposed.
If there is a difference of legal rule involved as to mode of performance,
without any quantitativeness as to what constitutes fulfillment of duty,
performance according to either or any mode required in the different
states with which the operative facts are connected should be held to
constitute full performance. If a difference as to mode of performance
in question is not one as between or among domestic legal rules but mere-
ly of custom or usage in two or more states, it would seem that the prob-
lem involved is merely one of interpretation and should be so treated and
determined as well as can be done from the facts and circumstances of
the case. If performance in a particular state has been expressly or
impliedly specified, it would ordinarily be natural and reasonable to
conclude that the mode of performance usual in that state was manifestly
intended by the parties. A rule of construction to this effect, to be
applied in the absence of actual indication of intention as to mode of
performance would seem not to be subject to criticism.,,
As for damages, it must be remembered that a question of the measure
of damages is one of the extent of enforceability of the secondary "duty"
or "obligation." It is therefore suggested that under the proposed rule,
the domestic rule of the state in which the greater or greatest amount
of damages would be imposed in a domestic case be applied to such
questions.
As to "intrinsic validity" particularly, and perhaps even as to "formal
validity," the courts apparently are struggling against theoretical pre-
conceptions and formulistic habits of thought in efforts to apply rules
which produce maximum enforcement of promises. They do so because
they feel that in this way the most desirable economic consequences are
produced,"9 even though their opinions have not reached the point of
openly describing the economic objective as the legal test by which their
dispositions are actually determined. The securing of general adoption
throughout the country, of conflict of laws rules which would assure
in advance of transactions, uniformity of desired economic consequences,
without dependency on haphazard factual circumstances extrinsic of the
68. See Heilman, supra note 21.
69. And the effect seems especially strong and general in the federal courts. Supra,
note 42, at 100-103.
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transactions themselves would, it is felt, be an attainment far greater
than the general establishment of conflict of laws rules capable of cer-
tainty and precision of application as to any transaction only after it
had reached a court in litigation. The latter type of rule would some-
times result in one kind of legal consequences (e.g., enforcement) and
sometimes in another kind (e. g., non-enforcement), and its economic con-
sequences would depend not on the intrinsic characteristics of the
transaction itself but upon the place of occurrence or anticipated occur-
rence of some factual element, artificially designated from the aggregate
of facts of an interstate factual situation, or would even be dependent
upon the place of litigation.7 ° Such fortuitousness should, to as full an
extent as possible, be eliminated as a determinant of legal consequences
and of the economic and social consequences dependent upon them.
Perhaps nothing better illustrates this uncertainty in the "contract"
field and its undesirability than the condition of the decisions on con-
flicts of laws problems concerning Statute of Frauds provisions. These
problems not only present considerations involved generally in ques-
tions of "formal validity," including the possibility of applying any of
the various rules (e.g., rule of "place of contracting," rule of "place of
performance," rule of "place presumably intended") and a possible ob-
jective of effecting enforceability, but also embrace the possibility of
the application of the rule of the forum. There is involved, further,
the possible objective, usuall unarticulated, of producing results, by
applying the lex fori, of the sort which would be produced by applica-
tion of that rule in a domestic case. Such an inclination is, of course,
by no means non-existent in the "contract" field generally or in any
other field of conflict of laws adjudication, but the possibility of em-
ploying the formula "lex fori determines questions of procedure" offers
special temptation. This condition of the decisions on Statute of Frauds
problems, it should be noted, is to no little extent the effect of the influ-
ence and unanalytical acceptance of an English decision 71 which adopted
the rule of the forum. This decision applied the formula just mentioned
to the Fourth Section of the Statute of Frauds on the specious basis
that its phraseology, "No action shall be brought," etc., made it solely
procedural in its effect when applied, and distinguished it from the Sev-
70. "To apply the law which will uphold the contract if it have some bona fide sub-
stantial connection with the place of that law would, it is believed, in carrying out the
purposes that the parties had in view in their negotiations, a contract, better serve business
convenience in making the acts of the parties legally conform to what they purport to be."
Stumberg, supra note 51, at 184.
71. Leroux v. Brown, 12 C. B. 801 (1852). This decision contradicted at least two
previous ones: Carrington v. Roots, 2 M. & W. 248 (Exch. 1837); Reade v. Lamb, 6 Exch.
130 (1851).
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enteenth Section (the phraseology of which was "No contract shall be
allowed to be good," etc.), which was still treated as substantive in effect,
as it had been treated previously in decisions. Not only do the statutes
of the different American states vary in phraseology, but the American
courts differ as to what rule should be applied. Moreover, there is much
contrariety of treatment even of identically-worded and similarly-worded
statutes, notably as to statutes phrased more nearly like the Fourth Sec-
tion than like the Seventeenth Section of the English statute." Thus,
after a case involving a Statute of Frauds provision has been brought
before a particular forum there may be no doubt as to what rule will
lbe applied under the particular facts, but in the greater number of
instances it is impossible to predict the judicial fate of a particular
transaction before it is known in what state suit will be brought.
It should not be overlooked that the interest of a particular state
in a domestic rule of its own may pertain only to its local application
in domestic cases and may be unconcerned with its employment as a
conflict of laws rule for interstate transactions. This is implicit in the
very fact that any rule adopted in the decision of a domestic case is
only a domestic rule which encompasses no more than what is involved
in the factual situation presented. This is a point which the pseudo-
territorial method totally excludes from consideration, thereby ignoring
the social and economic effects of the employment of particular rules as
conflict of laws rules affecting the larger community concerned with an
interstate factual situation. It may be of importance, conceivably, in
the economic situation of a state which has an inhibitory domestic rule,
that interstate transactions of the kind to which the rule pertains should
be given enforcement, although as to domestic transactions the nullifying
effect of the rule may be locally expedient and desirable.
The above observations would seem to be applicable with especial
strength to domestic rules which are no longer regarded even locally
as having any distinguishable social utility, but which still exist as mere
remnants of earlier times in which they may have served some social
purpose or may have been regarded as doing so. Such domestic rules
certainly should not be permitted to stand as obstacles preventing the
enforceability of interstate contractual transactions.73 Legal theory
72. Lorenzen, The Statute of Frauds and the Conflict of Laws (1923) 32 YALE L. J.
311, 314.
73. Statute of Frauds provisions, it is believed, are examples of rules which ought not
to be given the far-reaching inhibitory effects which they have in not a few instances been
employed to impose with reference to interstate transactions. This attitude concerning
such provisions is not infrequently taken judicially. "Whether the Statute of Frauds does
more harm than good is an open question; but there is no doubt that the courts are tak-
ing all cases out of its operation when they can give an apparently reasonable ground
for doing so." Corbin, Contracts of Indemnity and the Statute of Frauds (1928) 41 HARv.
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which cannot give enforcement despite such domestic rules should be
discarded.74 Moreover, by embodying strong economic and other social
objectives in conflict of laws rules, momentum may be added to the
sweeping away of domestic rules which have no justification for con-
tinued existence.
The chief functions which the rules of Conflict of Laws ought to be
made to serve are: to provide certainty and uniformity as to predicta-
bility of legal consequences of specific factual situations; beyond that,
to provide to the greatest extent possible through the imposition of
legal consequences, uniformity of economic and other social consequences
of the kind generally thought desirable throughout the larger common-
wealth. The domestic rules of particular states should be excluded from
application to the extent that their employment might impede or defeat
this accomplishment.
L. RBv. 689, 707. There may be not a few types of domestic rules of law, possibly in-
cluding a number of general statutory ones and certainly including some local statutory
ones which are not general, which, when considered from an economic and social view-
point in reference to conflict of laws problems, would be seen as not justifiably em-
ployable to bar the judicial enforcement of interstate transactions. Particularly may this
be true of subjects concerning which the greatest diversity exists in the domestic rules of
the states of this country, indicating that there is by no means general recognition of the
merit of any particular kind of domestic rule in reference to those subjects.
74. "Theory is the most important part of the dogma of the law, as the architect is
the most important man who takes part in the building of a house. The most important
improvements of the last twenty-five years are improvements in theory. It is not to be
feared as unpractical, for, to the competent, it simply means going to the bottom of the
subject." Holmes, supra note 26, at 477, COLLECTED LEcAL PAPFRs (1921) at 200.
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